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1. Introduction 
The testimonies by indigenous whalers 
from Alaska, Greenland, Chukotka and 
the US Pacific Northwest at the 67th 
meeting of the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) in Florianópolis, 
Brazil, in September 2018 were truly 
moving. Makah, Inuit, Eskimos and 
Chukchi as well as Caribbean Bequaians 
stood side by side, backed by their 
respective national governments, asking 
the Commission to listen to their plights 
and to renew the quota for some large 
cetaceans that are subject of the 
International Whaling Commission. For 
this quota renewal, which must be 
decided upon by the Commission by a ¾ 
majority, takes place only every 6 years 
and 2018 thus marked the year of such 
renewal. 
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1 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling of 2 December 1946 (161 UNTS 72).  
This contribution examines the process 
of the recently adopted quota allocation 
and changes to the management of 
cetaceans subject to Aboriginal 
Subsistence Whaling (ASW). Drawing 
from field notes of the author who 
attended the meeting as an observer, this 
paper summarises the discussions on the 
International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).1 
Particular emphasis is thus placed on the 
individual understandings of what the 
ICRW is to achieve and what role 
indigenous communities play in it. 
 
2. A brief history of the Whaling 
Convention and Commission 
To understand the current whaling 
regime, it is necessary to briefly sketch 
the history of the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC). The IWC is based on 
Article III of the ICRW, which was 
concluded by the major whaling nations 
at that time: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Peru, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
The convention came into force on 10 
November 1948 and had an original 
membership of eight of the whaling 
states. By 2018, this membership has 
risen to 89 members, the latest of which 
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is Liberia which has become a full 
member of the IWC in August 2018.  
Originally, the IWC was considered a 
“whalers’ club,”2 primarily concerned 
with the advancement and further 
development of the whaling industry, as 
enshrined in the last  preambular 
paragraph of the ICRW: “Having 
decided to conclude a convention to 
provide for the proper conservation of 
whale stocks and thus make possible the 
orderly development of the whaling 
industry.”3 The world’s whale species 
were thus perceived as a resource that 
could be exploited on a large scale while 
being protected for the benefit of the 
whaling industry. In order to do so, an 
elementary part of the ICRW is the 
Schedule which outlines specific 
provisions and catch limits for specific 
regions and species. At the time of the 
ICRW’s conclusion, however, species-
based quotas were not applied. Instead, 
whale hunting was regulated by the so-
called blue-whale-unit (BWU), based on 
the importance of the blue whale for 
international trade. The BWU thus 
provided for the ratio one blue whale, 
two fin whales, two and a half 
humpback whale, or six sei whales. In 
other words, the larger the whale, the 
better for the respective whaler since 
with less effort more whale tonnage 
could be produced. This inevitably led to 
the so-called ‘whaling Olympics’ and a 
                                                   
2 Arne Kalland and Brian Boeran, Japanese Whaling. End of an Era? (Routledge 1992), 13.  
3 ICRW, Preamble.  
4 Alexander Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy. Defining Issues in International Environmental Law (Edward 
Elgar 2005), 4. 
drastic reduction of stocks of large 
cetaceans. Only in 1972 it was decided to 
replace the BWU with species-based 
quota allocation.4 
Throughout the 1970s a paradigmatic 
shift in the perception of ‘the whale’ 
occurred, prompted by the rise of the 
environmental movement, the adoption 
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA) in 1972 in the United States and 
the 1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE). Given the ever-
declining populations of large whales, 
the UNCHE called for a moratorium on 
commercial whaling, which the IWC 
agreed upon in 1982, yet starting from 
the whaling season 1985/86. In other 
words, more than ¾ of the Commission 
members voted for a Schedule 
amendment that put in place catch 
quotas of zero for all whale species 
under the purview of the Commission. 
Even though this zero catch quota was to 
be in place only for a few years, up to the 
present day it has not been lifted. To the 
contrary – it has been solidified given 
that the steep rise of membership since 
the putting in place of the moratorium 
caused a shift from whale utilisation to 
whale preservation within the 
Commission. After all, the majority of 
rather recent members are nations 
opposed to whaling, despite not 
6 
 
necessarily themselves having a history 
of whaling. 
Even though the joining of Caribbean, 
African and South Pacific Island states – 
most of whom are nations supporting 
the sustainable use of whales and thus 
oppose the moratorium – has increased, 
the number of states aiming for a lift of 
the moratorium, the necessary ¾ 
majority, has not yet been reached. This 
situation, i.e. the attempts of whaling 
nations5 and supporters of sustainable 
use to have the moratorium lifted vis-à-
vis so-called ‘like-minded states’ 
opposing the extractive use of whales, 
has led many, particularly media 
commentators, to ascribe the IWC to be 
in a state of deadlock.6 Based on my own 
observations, however, it strongly 
depends on who is asked about the state 
of the IWC: it is first and foremost 
sustainable use supporters that are 
unable to lift the moratorium that 
consider the IWC to be dysfunctional 
due to the opposing views on whales 
and whaling. On the other hand, those 
supporting the moratorium and the non-
extractive use of whales consider the 
Commission perfectly functionable since 
it is able to uphold the moratorium. 
Especially the so-called ‘Buenos Aires 
Group’, consisting of Argentina, Brazil, 
                                                   
5 First and foremost Japan, Norway and Iceland. 
6 E.g. Tom Hirsch ‘Whaling moratorium under review’ BBC News, 19 July 2004. URL: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3905487.stm (accessed 21 September 2018); Tetsushi 
Yamamura ‘Japan seeks IWC reform to resume commercial whaling’ The Ahasi Shimbun, 6 July 2018. 
URL: http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201807060009.html (accessed 21 September 2018).  
7 At IWC67, Nicaragua has somewhat diverted from the overall direction of the Buenos Aires Group.  
8 ICRW, Schedule, para. 13.  
Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, 
Peru and Uruguay,7 is a strictly anti-
whaling alliance, as we will see below.  
 
3. Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling 
Despite a zero catch limit on whales 
being in place, since the adoption of this 
moratorium indigenous whaling, ASW, 
was excluded. The ICRW itself, 
however, does not hold any provision on 
ASW. Instead, paragraph 13 of the 
Schedule establishes “catch limits for 
aboriginal subsistence whaling to satisfy 
aboriginal subsistence need for the 1984 
whaling season and each whaling season 
thereafter.” 8 The IWC has thus 
recognised four regions in which ASW is 
conducted: Alaska and Washington 
State in the USA, Chukotka in Russia, 
Greenland and Bequia in St Vincent and 
the Grenadines. This means that 
communities engaged in whaling are 
assigned a quota based on the advice of 
the IWC’s Scientific Committee in 6-year 
blocks. In order to get this quota, 
however, the respective national 
governments are to submit a ‘Needs 
Statement’, which outlines the 
subsistence needs of the respective 
indigenous people and which is decided 
upon by the Commission. This Needs 
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Statement was to be submitted before 
every quota renewal.  
Two issues should be considered in this 
context: (1) ASW is not a matter of course 
despite ASW existing in the context of 
the IWC. This is best exemplified by the 
attempts of the Makah Tribe to obtain a 
quota for grey whales in the 1990s. 
However, since they voluntarily gave up 
whaling in 1915 due to conservation 
concerns, it was argued that a grey 
whale quota in 1990s would not be 
necessary. The struggle lasted for several 
years and only in 1997 a quota was 
assigned.9 (2) Even though an 
indigenous people has a history of 
whaling, this does not mean that its 
government shows support for its 
whaling history. A case in point is the 
long-standing history of interaction with 
the sea of the Ainu in northern Japan, 
including the hunt for whales and 
seals.10 Although Japan is the most vocal 
champion of sustainable use and 
commercial whaling, it has never 
submitted a Needs Statement on behalf 
of the Ainu. One reason might be that the 
situation of the Ainu as an indigenous 
people in Japan is a tricky one and 
marked by controversy.11 This 
notwithstanding, it seems fair to say that 
                                                   
9 See Emily Brand, ‘The Struggle to Exercise a Treaty Right: An Analysis of the Makah Tribe’s Path to 
Whale’ Environs: Environmental Law & Policy 32, 287–319.  
10 E.g. Carl Etter. Ainu Folklore: Traditions and Cultures of the Vanishing Aborigines of Japan (Westchester: 
Willcox & Follett, 1949), 164–173.   
11 Hiroshi Maruyama. Japan’s post-war Ainu policy. Why the Japanese Government has not recognised 
Ainu indigenous rights? Polar Record, 49(2): 204–207. 
12 IWC, Proposal for a Schedule Amendment on Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, IWC/67/01, later 
IWC/67/01 Rev 1., p. 1.   
ASW is far from being a normality 
within the IWC.  
 
4. The Proposed Schedule Amendment 
With this in mind let us now turn to the 
67th meeting of the IWC, which was the 
venue when new ASW quotas were to be 
decided, based on the 6-year blocks 
underlying the quota allocation. 
However, the four states in which ASW 
is conducted – Denmark (on behalf of 
Greenland), the Russian Federation, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, and the 
United States – submitted a proposal for 
Schedule amendments which went 
beyond quota allocation, but which 
contained more far-reaching elements 
the most important of which were (1) 
updated carry-over provisions; (2) a one-
time extension of 7 years until 2025; and 
(3) limited automatic renewal of the 
quota including safeguards to protect 
whale stocks.12  
 
4.1. Updated Carry-Over Provisions 
Concerning the first point, it is 
particularly Section 13(b), which sets 
catch limits for ASW, which is of 
relevance. Previously, each ASW hunt 
was allocated a specific quota for a 
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specific species. If the quota was not 
reached, a certain number of strikes were 
possible to carry forward into 
subsequent years. For instance, in the 
case of the ASW quota for bowhead 
whales in the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort 
Seas, the Schedule read:  
 
For the years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017 and 2018 the number of 
bowhead whales landed shall not 
exceed 336. For each of these years 
the number of bowhead whales 
struck shall not exceed 67, except 
that any unused portion of a strike 
quota from any year (including 15 
unused strikes from the 2008–2012 
quota) shall be carried forward and 
added to the strike quotas of any 
subsequent years, provided that no 
more than 15 strikes shall be added 
to the strike quota for any one year.13 
 
The proposed amendment went 
significantly further and provided for 
the carry-over of a maximum of 50% of 
the annual strike limit. The United 
States, on behalf of the proponents, 
explained that in light of the drastically 
changing environmental conditions in 
the Arctic and the associated 
increasingly difficult hunting 
conditions, an updated carry-over 
formula would address the issue of when 
whales are caught and not how many. 
This would, according to the 
                                                   
13 ICRW, Schedule, Section 13 (b) (1) (i). 
proponents, serve both the whalers and 
the whales since the former would no 
longer have the pressing need to meet 
their quota, possibly endangering 
themselves in difficult environmental 
conditions; and further, it would benefit 
the whales, and thus conservation, since 
the struck-and-loss rate would be 
notably reduced.  
 
4.2. One-time Extension of 7 Years until 
2025 
In light of the political challenges 
surrounding the renewal of the ASW 
quota, the proponents suggested a 
Schedule amendment, which extends 
the period for a quota renewal until 2025, 
and thus creates a buffer year in which 
quota allocations and possible changes 
to the time period can be discussed, 
paired with the expiration of ASW 
quotas. In this particularly case, 
therefore, Section 13 (b) of the Schedule 
would see catch limits for the years 
2019–2025 until new quotas would be 
decided.  
 
4.3. Automatic Renewal 
This proposition constituted the most 
controversial element of the Schedule 
amendment and would mean that the 
Schedule would automatically be 
amended at the end of each block period 
to include catch quotas for six (or 
ultimately seven) years for all ASW 
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countries. In other words, the proposed 
Schedule amendment would no longer 
be based on a ¾ majority of the 
Commission members, but would occur 
without affirmative action by the 
Commission. The proponents justified 
this step by noting that there is always 
the fear of quota renewals being voted 
down by the Commission, i.e. the 
Schedule amendments which include 
the quota renewals not reaching the ¾ 
majority. They furthermore argued that 
this automatic renewal would contribute 
to trust-building and transparency as 
well as benefiting the Commission to 
allocate time and resources to other 
matters. To this end, the proponents 
suggested the insertion of a sixth and 
seventh paragraph into Section 13 (a) of 
the Schedule, which were to read:  
 
(6) Commencing in 2026, and 
provided the appropriate Strike 
Limit Algorithm has been 
developed by then, catch limits 
(including any carry forward 
provisions) for each stock identified 
in sub-paragraph 13(b) shall be 
extended every six years, provided: 
(a) the Scientific Committee advises 
in 2024, and every six years 
thereafter, that such limits will not 
harm that stock; and (b) the 
Commission does not receive a 
request for a change in the relevant 
catch limits based on need.  
                                                   
14 IWC, Proposal for a Schedule Amendment, p. 2. 
 
(7) The provisions for each stock 
identified in sub-paragraph 13(b) 
shall be reviewed by the 
Commission in light of the advice of 
the Scientific Committee.14  
 
The role of the Scientific Committee in 
the context of automatic renewal is 
crucial. The proponents thus saw the 
role of the Scientific Committee as 
overseeing the automatic renewal based 
inter alia on unchanging catch limits, the 
unchanged conservation status of the 
whale stocks and the requirement of 
ASW countries following a timeline for 
review and providing all relevant 
documentation and information as they 
have done previously. Conversely, if 
these conditions were not met, an 
automatic renewal would not occur. To 
this end, the proposal remarks:  
 
The continued requirement for 
Scientific Committee advice that the 
status quo catch limits will not harm 
the hunt is an important safeguard. 
If, for example, there were a 
catastrophic decline in abundance, 
or any other basis for concern by the 
Scientific Committee such that it was 
unable to advise on the 
sustainability of the hunt, then the 
renewal would not automatically 
occur. Alternatively, if there were a 
request in the catch limits based on a 
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change in need, then the automatic 
renewal would also not occur.15  
 
5. Discussion and Vote 
As could be expected, the discussions 
surrounding the Proposal were 
emotional and somewhat heated.16 
Indigenous representatives from the 
national delegations of the United States, 
Russia and Denmark as well as the 
Commissioner of St Vincent & the 
Grenadines in moving speeches outlined 
the necessity for the quota renewal as 
well as for the other proposed Schedule 
amendments. Important in this aspect is 
that they did not ask the IWC for an 
increase in quota, but rather for an 
increase in flexibility17 while the 
automatic renewal as well as the carry-
over provisions provide for good 
management practices of indigenous 
peoples, which should be based on 
treaties, conventions and rights.18 Yet, 
also the role of the scientific community 
was highlighted in the testimony by a 
representative of the Makah, who 
thanked the Scientific Committee for the 
review of the Makah hunt.19 The 
Commissioner of St Vincent & the 
Grenadines noted that it is somewhat 
obsolete to justify the taking of four 
                                                   
15 Ibid., p. 10.  
16 Recordings of the discussions can be found on the YouTube channel of the International Whaling 
Commission: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCLtg7GtpJ_eTaJuPqRyOOhQ.   
17 Alaskan representative, field notes, 11 September 2018.  
18 Greenlandic representative, field notes, 11 September 2018. 
19 Makah representative, field notes, 11 September 2018.  
20 St Vincent and the Grenadines, field notes, 11 September 2018.  
21 India, field notes, 12 September 2018.  
whales (1) since the same presentation 
has been made for the last 18 years and 
(2) the methods of the hunt since the 19th 
century have essentially remained the 
same. He furthermore noted that the 
right for indigenous peoples to hunt 
whales is not a handout, but it is their 
right.20 
The ensuing discussion brought to the 
fore long-standing issues that have 
caused the disruption in the 
Commission. On the one hand, 
Commission members did not want to 
challenge the right of indigenous 
peoples to harvest whales. To this end, 
most states, including anti-whaling 
states such as New Zealand, Australia or 
India, supported the proposal. India, 
supported by Gabon, however, whilst 
supporting the proposal, urged the 
Commission to help indigenous peoples 
to develop alternative livelihoods which 
would move away from an extractive to 
a non-extractive use of whales. In how 
far this was to be achieved in resource-
scarce communities in Alaska or 
Greenland was not elaborated upon, 
however.21 
On the other hand, the 
commercialisation of whale products 
and thus the hunt for commercial 
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purposes was, once again, discussed. 
Subject to debate was, in this context, the 
clause on automatic renewal of the 
quotas which some states saw as 
contributing to conservation issues 
while theoretically opening the door for 
commercial whaling. Concerning the 
former, only after the proponents had 
submitted a slightly revised proposal in 
which the role of the Scientific 
Committee was strengthened and thus a 
safeguard for conservation was 
provided, for example Grenada 
supported the proposal in its entirety. 
Concerning the latter, the fear was – 
based on my own reading of the 
comments made – rooted in the setting 
of a precedent of whales being handled 
as a commodity without the 
Commission serving as a regulator. 
Especially Colombia made this case and 
highlighted that it is the provision on 
automatic renewal which would prevent 
it from supporting the proposal. Indeed, 
also other members of the Buenos Aires 
Group expressed their opposition to the 
proposal due to their traditionally anti-
whaling stance (Uruguay) or due to 
insufficient application of the 
precautionary principle (Costa Rica).22 
This stance was particularly supported 
by some NGOs whose interventions 
                                                   
22 Uruguay and Costa Rica, field notes, 11 September 2018.  
23 Iceland, field notes, 12 September 2018; While the term ‘science’ appears clear-cut, also Iceland would 
be subject to criticism later on in the meeting due to their strike limit algorithm tuning level which was 
more conservative than that other apply. For the role of science within the IWC, see Heazle, Michael. 
Scientific Uncertainty and the Politics of Whaling (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006).  
24 Guinea and Korea, field notes, 11 September 2018. 
25 IWC. Forty-Fifth Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC Secretariat, 
1995), p. 55. 
reflected unease particularly concerning 
the automatic renewal, none of which, 
however, opposed aboriginal 
subsistence whaling as such. This 
notwithstanding, it became clear 
throughout the discussions that 
scientific findings were to serve as the 
basis for the consideration of automatic 
renewal. Especially Iceland made the 
case that the arguments made were 
based on science and not on needs, 
irrespective of the divisions within the 
IWC.23 
A third narrative was inserted into the 
discussion by Guinea, which was later 
on picked up by several other states, 
including Korea, which has always 
followed its own line of argumentation 
within the IWC: food security.24 While 
the issue itself has been on the agenda at 
least since 1995 in the wake of the 
Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security 
hosted by Japan in 1994, which was 
supported by the FAO,25 since the early 
2000s the issue had entered the 
normative debates on the role of the IWC 
and has been brought up on numerous 
occasions. Especially at IWC65 in 2014 
food security rose to the surface with the 
submission of a draft Resolution on Food 
Security by Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
Republic of Guinea and Benin, which, 
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however, did not reach consensus.26 Be 
this as it may, also in the context of ASW 
food security played once again a role. 
Particularly a Chukchi whaling captain 
highlighted the importance of whales as 
a food source: “If we are left with no 
whales, my people will just [go] 
extinct.”27  
While the overall sense was that the 
proposal would find strong support, a 
consensus could not be reached. The 
final outcome reached the necessary ¾ 
majority for the Schedule amendments, 
however: Yes: 58; no: 7; abstain: 5.28 
Apart from Gabon, which abstained, all 
states voting ‘no’ or abstained were 
Latin American states, as Table 1 shows. 
It is noteworthy that Nicaragua, which 
has traditionally belonged to the Buenos 
Aires Group, voted, contrary to the other 
members, ‘yes’ to the proposal.29 
 
 
Table 1: Voting results of the ASW Proposal.  
                                                   
26 IWC. Report of the 65th Meeting of the International Whaling Commission and Associated Meetings 
and Workshops (Cambridge: IWC Secretariat, 2014), p. 1.  
27 Chukchi representative, field notes, 11 September 2018.  
28 Some countries had their voting rights suspended either due to unclear credentials or failure to pay 
their participation fee. Others were not present at the meeting.  
29 In fact, Nicaragua clearly diverged from the course of the Buenos Aires Group in the meeting. Most 
importantly, Nicaragua voted ‘yes’ to Japan’s Way Forward Proposal, which inter alia would have seen 
an allocation of a small quota for non-aboriginal hunts, meaning an effective lifting of the moratorium 
on commercial whaling. It furthermore abstained from the vote on Brazil’s Florianópolis Declaration 
(see Section 6 below).   
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6. The ICRW in 2018 
The rather overwhelming majority for 
the new ASW quotas and associated 
changes in the Schedule caused the 
meeting to enter a state of optimism. 
After all, many of the arguments that 
were put forth were indeed based on 
science and hardly any state requested a 
new Needs Statement from the ASW 
countries. The relief that swept through 
the indigenous organisations that were 
present and that were requesting a quota 
was significant and the happiness over 
the support from the IWC members 
caused many to enter a state of rejoice. 
Apart from some members of the Buenos 
Aires Group, nobody fundamentally 
questioned the right and needs of 
aboriginal communities to hunt whales. 
Particularly the Alaskan Eskimo 
Whaling Commission, whose members 
gave moving testimonies, received the 
result extremely positively, as Image 1 
demonstrates. 
 
 
 
Image 1: Relieved members of the Alaskan Eskimo Whaling Commission in front of 
the table showing the ASW vote. Courtesy of Nikolas Sellheim (2018).  
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Also for states supporting the principle 
of sustainable use – in their view the true 
objective of the convention – the 
outcome of the ASW vote was 
encouraging, particularly in light of the 
impending agenda items dealing with 
the future direction of the IWC. In this 
context, two contrasting proposals were 
going to be presented: one resolution by 
Brazil and others – the Florianópolis 
Declaration – which would locate the 
IWC in a more preservationist context; 
and one presented by Japan – the Way 
Forward Proposal – which would enable 
a co-existence between conservation and 
sustainable utilisation of whales. 
Moreover, the optimism that had 
grasped the Commission also resulted in 
working group work on yet another 
Resolution on Food Security, which, this 
time, was presented by Antigua & 
Barbuda, Cambodia, Ghana and Guinea. 
It seemed that for the first time since the 
adoption of the moratorium in 1982, the 
IWC would have indeed found a way to 
bridge the gap that has marked its 
operative capacities. 
The sense of optimism was only short-
lived, however. Because directly after 
the ASW vote, discussions on the future 
direction of the IWC quickly eradicated 
any hopes for bridging any gaps and the 
different interpretations of the ICRW30 
once again clashed. On the one hand, 
those favouring the proposal by Brazil 
                                                   
30 On the interpretation of treaties and the ICRW, see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, “The Whaling Convention 
and Thorny Issues of Interpretation,” in Whaling in the Antarctic. Significance and Implications of the ICJ 
Judgement, edited by Fitzmaurice, Malgosia and Dai Tamada (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2016), p. 53–138. 
31 ICRW, Preamble; own emphasis.  
saw the IWC as having moved beyond 
the utilisation of whales and having 
evolved into an organisation for the 
protection of whales. Thus, their 
interpretation of the convention focuses 
on the conservation elements therein, 
paired with the resolutions that were 
adopted fostering conservation and the 
resulting actions taken by the 
Commission bodies. On the other hand, 
sustainable use states, and first and 
foremost Japan, consider the IWC under 
the pretext of conservation and (or even 
for) sustainable use of whales. They thus 
stick to a formalistic, textual 
interpretation of the convention and in 
particular the last preambular 
paragraph, which is “to provide for the 
proper conservation of whale stocks and 
thus make possible the orderly 
development of the whaling industry.”31 
The clash of interpretation and the gap 
that is characteristic for the current state 
of the International Whaling 
Commission is reflected in the voting 
outcomes of both proposals, as Table 2 
shows: 
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Table 2: Voting results for the Brazil’s Florianópolis Declaration and Japan’s Way 
Forward Proposal 
 
The vote on Florianópolis Declaration 
was perceived by sustainable use state as 
a manifestation of the division that runs 
through the IWC. In a powerful 
intervention, the Commissioner of 
Antigua & Barbuda noted that the 
proponents, given their lack of 
willingness to negotiate this matter 
further “send this organisation into the 
abyss where the whales go when they 
die. [...] No other organisation, would 
have gone to a vote on a matter that is so 
divisive.”32 As a result, Antigua & 
Barbuda suspended all work on their 
Resolution on Food Security and 
withdrew its proposal, further 
indicating its future unwillingness to 
                                                   
32 Antigua & Barbuda, field notes, 13 September 2018.  
33 The presence is noteworthy since the relationship between the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strenuous as to Japan’s position in the IWC (see Ed 
Couzens. Whales and Elephants in International Conservation Law. A Comparative Study (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2014). 
34 Japan, field notes, 13 September 2018.  
financially contribute to the IWC and to 
participate in votes. Notably, none of the 
sustainable use states, not even Japan, 
withdrew from the organisation. 
Concerning the latter, it must be noted, 
however, that both the State Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
Masaaki Taniai, and Parliamentary Vice-
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Mitsunari 
Okamoto, gave opening statements in 
the meeting, indicating a unified 
position of the Japanese government on 
the matter of whaling.33 In the coming 
months, Japan is to “reassess” its 
position within the IWC as a result of the 
vote.34 
 
 Yes No Abs N/P 
Brazil Proposal 
(preservation) 
40 27 4  
Japan Proposal 
(conservation & 
sustainable use) 
27 41 2 1 
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7. Conclusion 
The 67th meeting of the International 
Whaling Commission was marked by 
hope and disappointment, particularly 
on the side of those states favouring the 
sustainable use of whales. While the 
Schedule amendments concerning 
Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling were 
adopted by a large majority, and the 
rights and needs of aboriginal whalers 
were substantiated within the 
Commission, this did not reflect into a 
normative change amongst Commission 
members. Concerning ASW, scientific 
certainty and an overall science- rather 
than a needs-based approach were taken 
that enabled Commission members to 
positively vote on the amendments to 
the Schedule. Contrasted with the 
outcomes of the votes on both Brazil’s 
and Japan’s proposals, this approach did 
not reflect into the voting behaviour of 
member states, however. To the 
contrary, the outcomes appear to have 
fortified the stances of the Commission 
members on whether or not non-
indigenous extractive use of whales can 
be pursued. The rather clear result is that 
41 of 70 members that voted on Brazil’s 
and Japan’s proposals favoured the 
solidification of the IWC as a whale 
preservation organisation in which only 
aboriginal people can hunt whales. One 
delegate remarked that this is merely 
political correctness and is not based on 
any sensible approach to whaling.35 
                                                   
35 Anonymous delegate, field notes, 13 September 2018.  
36 Iceland, field notes 11 September 2018.  
Indeed, Iceland’s Commissioner noted 
that “Iceland does not categorise people 
into different groups of people. For us 
what matters is not some needs 
statement, but simply whether the catch 
limits, of stocks that are of sufficient 
abundance, [are] for the catches to be 
sustainable.”36 
In light of the Schedule amendments, the 
IWC has moved towards a more 
respectful treatment of aboriginal 
whaling communities and it does not 
appear to be unrealistic to see the quota 
block be extended to seven years in the 
future. Concerning the overall direction 
of the Commission, it will all hinge on 
Japan’s “reassessment” of its position 
within the IWC. For if Japan decides to 
leave the organisation, its future is 
uncertain. 
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